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The U.S. Navy has been involved in a massive organization devel-
opment effort for the past six and one-half years. Begun as the out-
growth of a pilot internal action study group, the Navy program has
now reached system-wide proportions. Enjoying the support of top man-
agement, it has involved the majority of the Navy's operational units,
and is just beginning to work at the senior staff level.
Employing a survey-based approach to planned change, the Navy
Human Resource Management Cycle appears to contradict many of the ear-
lier tenets about what constitutes successful organization development.
The present effort is semi-structured, mandatory, repeatable, and uses
para-professionals as its principal agents of change. It faces a mod-
erate degree of uncertainty in its immediate future and is presently in
a stage of retrenchment and institutionalization.
This paper delves into the working of the Navy's pioneer large-
system change program, reviews its intimate family history, shares
some of its problems and learnings, discusses potential shortcomings,
and previews and makes recommendations for its future. It makes a con-
certed attempt to generalize from the Navy-specific experience to the
large system - general application of organization development.
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"In order to reduce the number of taboos that are operative in
a system, someone will probably first have to violate them."
(Steele, 197 S)

ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE U.S. NAVY EXPERIENCE
"Like beauty i the outlines of an organization are in the eyes of
the beholder." (Khandwalla, 1977)
By almost any stretch of the imagination the United States Navy
is a large organizational system. It is staffed by over 800,000 per-
sons (526,600 military and 310,100 civilians) has a budget that com-
prises 1.7% of the nation's gross national product (31.5 billion dollars),
and operates a tremendous number and variety of capital equipments (467
ships and 6800 aircraft) . As a hierarchically structured bureaucratic
system it spans over 23 levels of organization from recruit seaman (E-l)
to Admiral (0-10) . Seen as a complex socio-technical system, the Navy
organization spends over ^4% of its available funding on personnel
(social subsystem) expenditures; the estimated outlay for fiscal year
1977 is in excess of six billion dollars. (U.S. Navy, 1977)
Technologically the Navy relies upon the latest advances in weaponry
and support equipment, spending over 3.8 billion dollars a year to fund
its extensive research and development programs.
The Navy's broad based mission of national defense requires it to
contribute to the strategic nuclear deterrent, maintain open sea lines
of communications with the country's allies and foreign sources of raw
materials, provide for overseas projection of military power, and to
act as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.
How does the Navy match up as a large organizational system when
assessed against the yardsticks developed by organizational theorists
and writers? Many researchers into organizational functioning (Katz
and Kahn, 1966; Hunt, 1972; Huse and Bowditch, 1973; and Bak*»r, 1973),

following the lead of the early general systems theorists, have attempted
to define organizations in terms of open systems. An open system is
characterized by interdependence of its parts and one that is open to
matter-energy-information exchanges with a surrounding environment
(Kelly, 1974).
The organization-environment interface was most prominently described
by Emory and Trist. They (Emory and Trist, 1969) categorized environ-
ments into four basic types based upon their causal texture (the degree
to which goals and.noxiants are changing and the character of their dis-
tribution). The first type is a placid, randomized environment. The
second is called a placid, clustered environment. The third texture is
termed a disturbed, reactive environment. The fourth environment is the
most extreme and is called turbulent fields.
Zaltman and Duncan (1977) suggested that the principal character-
istics of organizations affecting their susceptibility to change and
innovation are complexity, formalization, and centralization. Complex-
ity is concerned with the number of occupational specialties present,
their degree of professionalism, and the level of task structure dif-
ferentiation. Formalization is related to the amount of emphasis
placed upon the following specific rules and regulations in performing
the organization's work roles or jobs. Centralization is defined in
terms of the location of authority and the decision making power within
the organization's structure.
Utilizing criteria developed from open systems theory, environ-
mental classification concepts, and susceptibility to change and innova-
tion, the Navy as an organizational system can be more completely defined
for analytical purposes. The foregoing criteria, employed as measuring

devices, show the Navy to be an open system; a highly complex, formal-
ized, and centralized organization; and as operating in a turbulent-
field type of environment.
This paper is concerned with a brief tracing of the history of
the Navy's formal organization development effort, a current sketch
of the contours of the present planned change program, a look at the
perplexities and puzzles arising from its use, a review of lessons
learned, what future implications and directions might be, a short dis-
cussion and recommendations section, and a closing summary. The intent
of this paper is to inform, challenge, and stimulate further thought
about the relevancy of organization development to all types of large
organizational systems.

"'How does a place like this get started?' Stanley asked, with a mix-
ture of hope and admiration, thinking that the knowledge might be use-
ful in the future. " (Ritti and Funkhouser, 1977)
A CAPSULE HISTORY: A PREVIEW OF COMING EVENTS
The U.S. Navy has been formally involved with organization
development since 1971 although informal localized efforts had been
initiated several years prior to that time. The primary precipitat-
ing factors involved in influencing the start of the effort were the
social change pressures originating in the larger American society as
well as the advent of a change-oriented Navy top leadership group
(Forbes, 1976). This effort has occurred in spite of the prevailing
idea among sociologists that the military is associated with a conserva-
tive ideology and is distrustful of social and political change
(Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1976).
In January 1971 at the behest of the Navy's senior uniformed leader,
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, a one year pilot program in Human Resource Manage-
ment was begun. The membership of the pilot group consisted of twenty-
four carefully screened, active duty volunteers. Composed almost equally
of officers and enlisted persons, the group was charged by the Chief of
Naval Operations to "develop and evaluate new ideas and techniques in
the human relations area" (Zumwalt, 1970).
The stated objective of the pilot program was to find ways to
improve the management of the Navy's human resources as well as to
increase the organization's ability to understand and communicate with
its people. During the planned life of the pilot program a wide variety
of past, existing, and envisioned approaches to accomplishing its broad
charter were investigated and analyzed. In the course of the group's
inquiry both intra-government and civilian developed programs and
A

techniques were scrutinized. The final recommendation, the culmination
of the program's work, was to propose Navy-wide adoption of an organiza-
tion development program (Moore, 1971).
Somewhat later Bowers, Franklin and Pecorella (1973), conducting
research into organization development under the sponsorship of the
Office of Naval Research, suggested that planned organizational develop-
ment might be a constructive response to a myriad of national level problems,
During March, 1971, while the pilot group was deeply involved in
its research effort, a Human Relations Project Office was created within
the Bureau of Naval Personnel. The office was to oversee and guide the
heretofore largely uncoordinated Navy programs in the general area of
human relations. This new activity was specifically charged with over-
all supervisory responsibility for the Navy programmatic efforts in
race relations education, alcohol and drug abuse education and rehabil-
itation, intercultural relations, civilian transition assistance, and
the fledgling human resource management pilot group.
In mid-1971 a senior pilot group member was reassigned to the
Project Office to both act as a liaison officer and to assume the duties
as the Navy's first Organization Development Program Director. With
the dissolution of the pilot group in January, 1972, the project office
became the central management point for implementing the recommended
system-wide organization development effort.
During the closing months of 1971 a small task group of project
office staff and pilot group members met continuously to produce the
broad outlines of a full scale planned change effort within the naval
establishment. The change strategy design that emerged from these
meetings was a synthesis of proven existing organization development

methods (i.e., the Managerial Grid Organization Development System,
the laboratory learning approach, the team development method, and
the instrumented survey-feedback process) (Forbes, 1976).
I
related to inducing large scale change. Several of the key decisions
were related to:

• Resources . The commitment of scarce money and people on a
priority level to a long ranged effort on the basis of largely
undemonstrated potential in a time of resource scarcity.
• Program Scope . The establishment of new regional consulting
centers geographically positioned so as to provide service to
concentrations of operational units on a voluntary, first-come/
first-served basis.
Structure . Maintaining the embryo organization development
program as a staff function, under centralized control, as one
service among many offered by the regional centers.
° Top Management Support . Continually seeking demonstration of
top management support and commitment in the form of obtaining
requested resource allocations, protection of program members
from hostile organizational elements, public and private endorse-
ment of program goals, and actual participation in some develop-
mental activities.
Education and Training . The creation of a staff selection and
training pipeline to provide the organization development program
with a large number (10*0) of organization development practitioners
in a short period of time (one year)
.
Evaluation and Continued Development . Initiation of a medium
scaled evaluation effort with an operations-oriented subsystem
(a cruiser-destroyer flotilla) while continuing ongoing program
development and refinement.
° Staffing. The utilization of Navy line management people with
limited training to act in an internal consultant capacity vice
employment of professional external change agents.

Throughout 1972 the regional consulting offices, christened Human
Resource Management Centers, were involved with preparing and furnish-
ing their physical facilities, local marketing of clients for the
command development and other programs, administering the seven step
organizational development process with those units choosing to become
involved, designing workshops and consultation services to support the
»
action planning phase of the change program, receiving and training
staff members, and providing progress feedback to the Washington, D.C.
based project headquarters. During this period it also became apparent
to Navy top management as the program experience base grew that the
organization development effort had some serious shortcomings as well
as significant strengths.
Major problem areas identified with the Command Development change
approach included:
(1) the military appearance and professional expertise of the
Navy consultants, (2) the capacity to reach only a small percentage of
of the total possible number of client units, (3) difficulties in estab-
lishing scheduling priorities, (4) little senior line management involve-
ment and ownership of the effort, (5) broad and diverse interpretations
of the activities in the command development process, (6) lengthy time
demands upon the client units, (7) overlap and competition with other
programs under the auspices of the project office, and (8) no clear-cut
program goals or objectives. The central strategy evolved for the reso-
lution of these difficulties was the "institutionalization" of the organi-
zation development approach into the everyday working fabric of Navy life,
The strategic mechanism chosen for the achievement of institutional-

ization involved shifting the selection and screening of potential con-
sultants to the purview of the traditional personnel managers utilizing
criteria acceptable to line management, the transfer of assets and
responsibility for accomplishing change program results to senior line
managers (fleet commanders), and the establishment of additional con-
sulting centers along with smaller more localized consulting activities
called Human Resource Management Detachments.
The Command Development process was streamlined and more closely
structured into an improved time-phased effort entitled the Human Resource
Management Cycle, making involvement in the new program mandatory for
fleet units. A five day portion of the cycle, called a Human Resources
Availability period, was included as a regular component of the routine
operational scheduling process. The revised process also integrated
delivery of significant aspects of the equal opportunity/race relations,
substance abuse education, and overseas diplomacy programs into the cycle
itself.
Positions on the senior line managers staffs were created and filled
to coordinate their newly assigned human resource management responsibili-
ties. Consultant training responsibility was shifted to the existent
Navy formal education system. Overall program sponsorship became the pre-
rogative of the Navy's top line manager, the Chief of Naval Operations
and the principal program resource support role was assigned to the Navy's
top personnel manager, the Chief of Naval Personnel.
Human resource management inspection criteria were built-in to the
Navy-wide, long established, routine administrative evaluation system.
A requirement was levied on all Navy organizations to individually develop
a written action plan to address significant organizational issues. A
set of intended, top management sanctioned, program outcomes was
published throughout the Navy organization.
9

The staging and management of the institutionalization of the
organization development process was orchestrated by the project office.
The process involved rough drafting of a comprehensive change document,
the solicitation of inputs and comments from those subsystems most
affected by its provisions, a joint review meeting, a redrafting, re-
commenting, and then final issuance as a formal Navy policy directive
from its top management office. The method was conducted throughout
in the pattern of the traditionally recognized organization development
values of shared power and participative decision making.
The new "cyclic" approach to planned organizational change was
primarily targeted at lower echelon operational units with the intent
to cover them all in a four to five year time span. Field testing of
the Human Resource Management Cycle approach was completed in late 1973
in three locations and approved for fleetwide introduction in January of
1974. The delivery system has remained fundamentally unchanged up to




"Finally one caterpillar gasped, 'Unless we try together nobody will
reach the top. Maybe if we give one big push!'" (Paulus, 1972)
CURRENT DESCRIPTION: SUNSHINE AND SHADOWS
The Navy-planned change approach is called "survey guided develop-
ment," and is roughly patterned after the organization development con-
sultant model developed by Kolb and Frohman (1970). In its present con-
figuration the program relies upon a survey-feedback change strategy;
is primarily aimed at the development of individual units; uses inter-
nal consultants as the principal agents of change; emphasizes short and
medium term changes, as well as long term payoffs; and strives toward a
goal of increased organizational effectiveness. It is also a highly
structured, time-bounded, mandatory program managed by the line struc-
ture of the Navy. The current directions for the program's administra-
tion and operation are contained in several publications available to
the individual Navy organization development practitioner (ODA, 1976;
Shear, 1975; Franklin, 1974; and Pecorella, 1974). Efforts are now
underway to produce a multi-volume, standardized, consultant guidebook.
Using a conventional systems model of organizations (March and
Simon, 1958) the present state of the Navy's organizational develop-
ment effort can be described and analyzed. Hellriegel and Slocum (1977),
building upon the work of Leavitt (1964) and others, proposed a com-
parative typology for assessing organization change models which divides
each effort into subsystems of major interacting variables. The major
system components include task, structure, technology and people.
° Task . The Navy organization development effort is complex in
terms of the diversity and perceived difficulty of accomplishment of
the desired program outcomes. These outcomes broadly fall into cate-
gories of improved mission achievement and increased human satisfaction
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among the organization's membership. This is consistent with the
desired outcomes of organization development interventions formulated
by Friedlander and Brown (19 74) in their comprehensive summary of the
research. Organizational outcome measures related to mission accom-
plishment include a higher state of operational readiness, improved
communications at all command levels, chain of command involvement in
efforts to increase the productivity and effectiveness of its human
assets, and a reduction in the incidence of adverse overseas incidents.
Anticipated achievements in the region of human satisfaction are: a
better awareness of the Human Goals Credo (a Department of Defense
document concerned with promoting equal opportunity and recognition of
individual human worth and dignity) , an improved image of the Navy as
a professional organization, better leadership and human resource
management practices at all organizational levels, insurance of equality
and uniformity in disciplinary and administrative practices, an increased
level of satisfaction with foreign duty assignments, better understanding
of the need for high standards of individual conduct, an increased organ-
izational ability to recognize and combat substance abuse problems,
improved retention of quality personnel, and the development of a human
goals action plan by all Navy units (Weisner, 1973).
These goals stand in some contrast to typical organization devel-
opment objectives. Golembiewski (1972), in contrasting public sector
organization development with traditional efforts, listed these object-
ives as: locating decision making and problem solving responsibility
close to data sources, increasing the self-control and self-direction
12

of organizational members, supplementing formal authority with knowledge
and competence authority, producing a reward system compatible with both
mission achievement and continued development, creating an open problem
solving throughout the organization, managing the organization by
relevant objectives, and increasing the sense of "ownership" of organi-
zational objectives throughout the membership.
Job standardization within the Navy effort has been attempted
through a written billet (role) description process, the issuance of
operating policy guidelines, a headquarters staff officer assigned to
oversee standardization, several representatively attended standardiza-
tion task group meetings, a common training pipeline, a set of uniform
personnel selection criteria, and the requirement for certain prescribed
activities to occur within the consultant-client relationship.
Navy organizational development work is repetitious in the sense
that the same basic sequence of events (data gathering, diagnosis,
intervention, and evaluation) occurs with each client system. Typically,
the sequence involves fairly intensive consultant involvement for about
eight to twelve weeks within an assigned total possible time frame of
eighteen to twenty-four months. New clients generally occur for each
consultant team at the rate of one per month. The work also contains
elements of uniqueness in that a large proportion of the activities which
occur with the client are tailored to its particular needs.
Structure. The Navy organization development program is only
one component of a larger human resource management support system which
is also concerned with the areas of equal opportunity/race relations
(including women's rights), substance abuse (drugs and alcohol) educa-
tion and rehabilitation, overseas diplomacy, and leadership and management
13

training. The program is under the direction and control of the Navy's
senior line managers. Its principal operating elements, within a com-
prehensive worldwide network, are four regionally situated consulting
centers reporting directly to various fleet commanders-in-chief. A
fifth center located in Washington, D.C., is tasked to serve the Navy's
large shore establishment; the Medical Corps and the formal educational
system are responsible for staffing and operating their own human resource
programs
.
The principal work role is that of the human resource management
(organization development) specialist which combines some aspects of
both the traditionally defined external and internal consultant roles.
Specialists, organized into human resource management support (organi-
zation development consultation) teams, are assigned by human resource
management center commanding officers to particular clients. Clients
are made available to centers on a regularly scheduled assignment basis
by the fleet commanders. Specialists work with client commanding offi-
cers in the primary role of temporary staff assistants. The specialist
is responsible both to his or her commanding officer and to the client
commanding officer for the quality and completeness of the organization
development effort.
Within the serai-flexible constraints imposed by the human resource
management cycle the specialists are free to operate as their training
and experience levels dictate. They are bound, however, by stringent
information disclosure rules that are designed to protect the confiden-
tiality of client generated data at both the level of the individual
respondent and the total client organization.
14

Communications at the consultant-client level are generally con-
sidered privileged information. Each consultant strives to establish
an open, free flow of data with the client systems he or she serves.
Communications flow within many centers is encouraged by case sessions
in a diagnostic clinic type format during which the analysis of a par-
ticular client effort is presented for peer review.
Responsibility for implementing the organization development pro-
gram for a particular client is vested in the individual practitioner
with a small amount of monitoring by the command structure at each cen-
ter. Management responsibility for the total systematic effort is
located at the apex of the line management hierarchy, in the office of
the Chief of Naval Operations. The actual day-to-day program responsi-
bility is assumed by a senior staff officer, the Assistant Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Human Resource Management (a Rear Admiral)
.
Fleet commanders take responsibility for the organization development
efforts under their immediate cognizance.
Authority for conducting the organization development program
resides in the written directives of the Chief of Naval Operations (Weis-
ner, 1973). Each center has a written charter that outlines both its
responsibilities and authority.
Decision making at the level of the individual client is usually
a shared proposition between the assigned specialist and the client's
commanding officer. Human Resource Management Center commanding officers
operate as semi-autonomous decision makers in the areas of budgeting,
resource expenditures, consultant operations, public affairs, client
loading, and other locally determined matters. Total system decision
making is characteristically conducted on a consultative basis between
the office responsible and the subsystems affected.
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Reward-punishment systems are primarily those of the traditional
Navy. At the level of the individual consultant intrinsic rewards such
as challenging work, opportunities for increased professional education,
personal growth, and regular promotion are available. Sanctions may
include peer disapproval, transfer to other work, poor performance
evaluations, oral admonitions by superiors, loss of specialty designa-
tion, and formal disciplinary actions.
° People . There are approximately 700 people involved full time
in active consultant, administrative, and support positions, including
ft
a small percentage of civilians. Of these about 400 are specialists
assigned to a human resource management center or detachment. The
specialists are about equally divided between middle grade officers
(0-3 to 0-5) and senior enlisted ranks (E-6 to E-9) and include in
their membership ethnic minorities and women. They are products of
a formal twelve week Human Resource Management School conducted under
the jurisdiction of the Chief of Naval Education and Training. The
school is located at Memphis, Tennessee, and provides basic instruc-
tion in both organization development content and process areas as
well as Navy program specifics.
The usual tour of duty as a specialist is for three years followed
by a reassignment to regular fleet duty in their warfare or occupa-
tional specialty. The source of specialists is via the routine person-
nel assignment process although individuals may voluntarily request this
type of duty. Successful consultants are given an organizational coding
indicating their consultant expertise which increases the likelihood
of a reassignment to human resource management work at a subsequent
point in their Navy careers.
16

A comparative study of work-related values was conducted by the
Institute of Social Research for the Navy (Bowers, 1975) using represen-
tative samples of 2522 Navy men and 1855 civilians. This study contrasted
the most and least important features of a preferred job and achieved a
high level of individual factor mean value agreements (within .06)
between the two groups. Additional support for the idea that values
held by the Navy and the civilian sector are roughly equivalent is pro-
vided by research conducted by the Center for Advanced Studies and Anal-
yses, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, (1971) and by Blair and Bach-
man (1976). Although no reported studies have been made on Navy organi-
zation development specialists it can be hypothesized that their value
orientations are very similar to those of their Navy contemporaries.
Norms observed among ^consultants by the author over a six year
period include power equalization, shared decision making, credibility
based upon knowledge and expertise vice rank, commitment to quality
product delivery, candor in professional communications, and confronta-
tion as a problem solving approach.
Consultant leadership styles seem generally to parallel those
found in persons of analogous rank in the Navy managerial hierarchy.
In a study conducted on a sample of 627 -Navy respondents (Kjono, 1976)
using the Leadership Effectiveness and Adaptability Questionnaire
(LEAD) , results indicated that the predominant preferred leadership
style was one that was characterized by high task and high relationships
behavior. These results compare favorably with LEAD scores from a much
larger (over 20,000) data base generated by Hersey and Blanchard (1977)





Preliminary research on consultant competency conducted by the
McBer Company (McClelland, 1975), at the Navy's request, into motiva-
tional patterns of successful Navy organization development specialists
revealed some interesting findings. When motive strengths (high, mod-
erate or low) in the areas of need for achievement, need for affiliation,
and need for power were analyzed the successful specialists were shown
to be moderate in need for achievement, high in need for affiliation,
and low in need for power. Successful line managers were determined to
have a very different type of motivational profile that consisted of a
moderate need for achievement, a low need for affiliation, and a high
need for power.
o Technology . The primary organization development technology
used in the Navy program is a derivative of the instrumented survey
feedback method. Blake and Mouton (1976), in their omnibus work on
consultation, classified survey feedback as a catalytic type of inter-
vention strategy. Bowers (1974) concluded, following comparative Navy-
civilian research into the effectiveness of various organization devel-
opment strategies, that the survey feedback methodology would be the
maximally useful approach for the majority of the sample tested.
The instrument in use in the Navy program is an eighty-eight ques-
tion third generation human resource management survey originally
developed jointly by the Institute of Social Research and the Navy.
It is organized around a causal flow model of organizational function-
ing and provides Likert-scaled responses in six categories: command
climate, supervisory leadership, peer group leadership, work group pro-
cesses and end results (Hooper, 1976). To date over 300,000 individual
surveys have been given in over 1,200 Navy commands.
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Once the survey is given, it is computer scored and consultant
analyzed. The summarized survey information is fed back to the client
organization in a series of meetings with ever descending levels of
leadership hierarchy. The data is interpreted by the client organiza-
tion for relevancy and meaning. Problem and opportunity areas are
identified. Data interpretations, along with client felt needs and
consultant perceptions, are utilized as inputs to formulate an inter-
vention design.
The design most often takes the form of workshops and consulting
services tailored to the client's identified needs. These activities
are normally provided by a consultant team during the unit's scheduled
five-day human resource availability period. Selected members of the
client unit, typically 10-40% of its assigned people, usually travel to
the consulting center to participate in these consultant designed
activities.
Follow-on services are provided on a mutually agreed upon basis
between consultant and client in the time period following the one week's
scheduled events. A short, approximately half-day, evaluation session
is scheduled with the client unit at about eight to ten months follow-
ing the availability period. At this time additional services may be
contracted for by the client, including a second survey administration,
to identify changes. This use of client time seems consistent with
current evaluative research into organization development interventions,
Porras (1977) suggests that the most effective approach might be client
participatory involvement for a period of 16-20 days and a consultant
involvement period of 13-24 months.
19

Aggregated survey data for collective subordinate units are also
available upon request to higher echelon organizational commanders to
assist in the assessment of their own performance. Normative data,
based upon selected organizational samples, are also available to cli-
ent units for comparative purposes while making their own information -
based organizational diagnoses.
The Navy's organization development consultants may also employ
specialized technologies such as management by objectives, team build-
ing, process consultation, conflict management, leadership style analy-
sis, time management, organizational action planning, communications
training, adult learning training, participative management techniques,
group decision making facilitation, collaborative problem solving,
job enrichment, role clarification, and transactional analysis in the
normal course of their work.
The Navy Personnel Research and Development Center in San Diego,
California, has been tasked with the responsibility for evaluating the
effectiveness of the Navy organization development effort. This activity
has initiated survey correlational studies into such diverse organiza-
tional variables as operational status reporting systems, maintenance
and material control, safety, occupational health, performance awards,
unauthorized absences and desertions, and substance abuse. In many
cases researcher investigation determined that correlations were impos-
sible due to instabilities and inconsistencies in the measurement of
the selected variables themselves. A more comprehensive user-oriented
evaluation methodology, as a product of the analysis of human
resource availabilities, has been suggested by Highsmith (1976).
20

The Navy organization development program to date has reached
almost 100% of the Navy's first line operational units. It has been
able to demonstrate a degree of impact in several key areas of organi-
zational functioning including non-judicial punishment (Crawford and
Thomas, 1977), operational performance (Mumford, 1976), and reenlist-
ment rates (Drexler and Bowers, 1974).
21

"Things go wrong in organizations. Equipment breaks down. Crises
destroy the peace. Competitors do the unexpected. And the people
are real. They don't move in unison. They have faces. Sometimes
they cry. Sometimes they spit. " (Leavitt, Dill and Eyring, 1973)
QUANDARIES AND CONUNDRUMS: STICKY WICKETS
Exploration sometimes leads to progress, perhaps more often its
path moves toward more questions, into new puzzles and perplexities.
So it has been with the Navy's organization development program. Re-
flective analysis has generated a series of developmental dilemmas as
yet largely unanswered and incompletely addressed. Clarification and
resolution of these complex questions could have significant impact on
the definition and direction of the Navy planned change effort. Although
these issues arise out of the Navy organization development experience
there are parallel implications for many large organizational system
change programs. To assist the reader in abstracting the relevant
meaning for his or her type organization the author will list a sampling
of the Navy issues and follow each in parentheses with what appears to
be the broader large-system question.
1. Navy organization development clients who are entering the
human resource management cycle for the second time or more appear to
require qualitatively different treatment than those who are appearing
for the first time. This creates a concern about how they should be
worked with to accommodate their prior exposure and experiences. (How
does an organization development effort change itself to work with
increasingly more sophisticated clientele?)
2. Navy program experience seems to indicate a rough correspond-
ence between client acceptance of consultants and their prior performance
as a line officer or senior enlisted person. Consultant skill and
knowledge required in a successful human resource management specialist
22

does not necessarily appear to correlate with previous line performance.
(How does an organization development design using internal change
agents balance the need for entry credibility with the client community
and the expertise level required of a good consultant?)
3. Navy consultants are provided an initial short intensive period
of training in a highly specialized organization development technology.
The demanding delivery schedule for human resource management cycles,
coupled with the specialist's relatively short (three years) period as
an operational consultant, leaves little time for additional training
and technological updating. (What is the best approach for keeping the
busy organization development practitioner abreast of the changing tech-
nology in the field and to which of the many developments available will
exposure be of the most benefit?)
4. The turnover of kep people in the Navy organizational develop-
ment effort has been such that the retention of historical knowledge
and perspective has been difficult to achieve. Consequently, resources
are consumed and time is lost in attempting efforts and researching deci-
sions that have been previously investigated and analyzed. (How can
provisions be made for retaining an ''organizational memory" to prevent
"rediscovery of the wheel" in the light of an organization's personnel
rotation policies?)
5. Some tentative preliminary findings into value and motivational
patterns for successful Navy organization development consultants indi-
cate a relatively high degree of disparity with the patterns of success-
ful line managers. Additionally, largely anecdotal information gathered
over the history of the Navy program indicates the possibility that
duty with the human resource management program may produce a much higher
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than average incidence of emotional and marital problems in its consult-
ants. (What happens to the value systems and attitudinal choices of
those persons who become involved in organization development work, and
are the changes compatible with the continuation of their effective
organizational functioning?)
6. The primary data gathering tool for the Navy organization devel-
opment program, the human resource management survey, was developed pri-
marily as a descriptive instrument to assess the state of organizational
functioning. Survey questions are constructed around the framework con-
trived for Likert's Survey of Organizations (Taylor, 1972), Because of
this framework the Navy survey appears to contain a built-in normative
bias toward the "System 4" participative oriented organizational style
(Likert, 1960). (How can an organization development effort select data-
gathering modalities that reduce or compensate for built-in normative
biases and obtain the most objectively based information possible?)
7. The Navy has invested considerable resources and maintains a
strong commitment in the survey-guided development approach to achieving
organizational development. This method has been employed on a mass scale
for over three and one-half years with only relatively minor evolutionary
modifications to its basic techniques. Some Navy commanders have bona
fide objections to the use of a survey as means of gathering attitudinal
information within their organizations. These complaints include: the
intrusiveness of the questions asked, the time demands Involved for the
respondents, the seeming irrelevancy of the data requested to individ-
ual and organizational functioning, generation of the expectation that
survey results will lead to actual changes, over-simplification of issues.
inability to account for unique local conditions, and not checking to see
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if managements needs are being met (Baldwin, 1975). Additionally, sig-
nificant questions concerning the appropriateness of a second go-around
using the same survey approach have arisen in both the specialist and
client communities. (When does large-scale capital investment in a
basic organization development approach become counter-productive for
the investigation of other methods? How does such investment prejudice
the decision for a timely succession by a more advanced technology?)
8. Much of the impetus toward producing a Navy organization
planned change program came from forces in the larger society pressing
for improvements in the social "good." The organizational effective-
ness and efficiency of Defense Department programs have been tradition-
ally tied to measurable increases in mission effectiveness and personnel
morale. The Navy organization development program finds itself in the
ambiguous situation of attempting to respond to both pressures for
improving both the social good and the level of task performance.
(To what extent should an organization development program become
involved in advocating and articulating organizational changes justi-
fied by enhancing social progress versus those changes resulting more
directly in better mission achievement?)
9. Demonstrating cause and effect relationships has been the
cornerstone in justifying the initiation and continuance of programs
both within and without the Navy for some years. Research into assess-
ing organizational functioning has uncovered a multiplicity of input,
intervening and output variables involved in a complex interaction.
The Navy organization development program, after some initially shelter-
ed years, is under heavy scrutiny to demonstrate its continued impact
in terms that make sense to the resource allocators. (In an evaluation
25

environment oriented toward demonstrating single-cause/single-effect
relationships t how do multiple-cause/multiple-effect organizational
improvement programs prove their worth?)
10. The early Navy Programmatic effort was criticized because
of its length, use of a skilled labor-intensive approach, and ability
to reach only a small segment of the entire system. Overall system
ft
impact, in particular, was considered to be a high priority goal of
the developmental effort. Voluntary client exposure had been shown to
be incapable of producing the volume of clients needed to produce per-
ceptible constructive change in the total Navy system, so a mandatory
requirement for participation was instituted. (What are the oost/bene-
fit considerations in a large system change effort for either volun-
tary or required participation by its members?)
11. Although most organization development literature indicates
system change results require three to five years to appear, the Navy
leadership structure has pressed for relatively immediate demonstrations
of effectiveness. The Navy resource allocation system appears to be
such that justification for program expenditures must be related on a
year-by-year basis and is subject to extra-Navy review [i.e., Department
of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and Congress]. (Since
demonstrations of large system change impact are generally conceded to
be a relatively long term procedure, how can short and medium results




We learn that 'OD' is alive and recuperating in Foggy Bottom."
(Bennis, 1974)
LESSONS LEARNED: PAINFUL EDUCATION
In the course of almost six and one-half years of experience with
»
the Navy large-system change effort certain lessons seem to loom larger
than life from their background as adjudged successes or failures.
These lessons were usually the result of painful experience and it was
most often in the overcoming of the pain that the knowledge of their
significance occurred. Once again, as in the preceding section, an
attempt is made to generalize from the specifics of the Navy experience
to the larger context of large-system change.
1. The pressures of a continuing cycle of clients, limited dura-
tion of professional training, and individual consultant proclivities
and talents have produced some tendencies toward a mismatch between the
diagnostic results of the Navy survey instrument and the activities of
the human resource availability week. The dictates of what should
occur as a consequence of developed data interpretations and the avail-
ability designs prepared and delivered by the human resource management
specialist are not always consistent. (The effectiveness of a develop-
mental effort may suffer when the "diagnosis" is not well related to
the- "treatment. ")
2. Navy senior enlisted persons have, in general, performed superb-
ly as organization development consultants. They have, after some ini-
tial officer leadership reluctance, been able to operate successfully
as consultants tc Navy commanding officers far superior in rank.
(Do not overlook the possibility of using first line supervisors as
change agents in a large-system development program, they bring a credi-




force alike.) For example, Joe Scanlon, father of the Scanlon Plan of par-
ticipative management, was most effective with both management and unions
because of his shop experience.
3. The Navy program experienced largely unexpected resistance to its
image as a facilitator of improved organizational effectiveness as a conse-
quence of its early violation of a number of the organization's traditional
norms and customs. The attiring of consultants in civilian clothing, using
informal egalitarian modes of address between officers and enlisted persons,
relying heavily on non-career identified consultants, longer than usual
haircut styles, 'and attempts at democratic organizational forms all seemed
to produce consequences dysfunctional to the program's change goals.
(Effective internal organizational consultants need to be able to appear
initially to be enough like their clients in outward appearance, speech,
and organizational goal identification so as to be acceptable to them; but
enough different in attitudes and knowledge so as to be seen having some-
thing useful to offer. Over time the external presentation of the success"
ful consultant seems to count much less than his or her ability to provide
meaningful assistance in the eyes of the client system.)
4. The Navy organization development program injected a heavy dose of
money, people, facilities, and demonstrations of top level commitment into
its organizational system over a relatively short time. This infusion seemed
to generate and sustain the momentum of the developmental effort despite a
major change in the top level administration and support structure. (The
phenomenon of bureaucratic inertia seems to be particularly operative in a
large organizational system. If it is possible to get the organizational
system moving with some degree of acceleration, even with powerful oppo-
sition, it will take some time to stop and reverse the newly established
trend.
)
5. The initial reaction of the Navy's top leadership layers to
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an organizational development approach was to consider it highly appro-
priate for the lower level operational units but not very appropriate
for improving their own level of functioning. It required consistent
demonstrations of effect among the operational units, coupled with rele-
vant information gathering techniques (aggregated survey data for sub-
ordinate units) to generate some degree of interest and real support
among the Navy's higher command levels. (There will be a tendency for
top leadership in a large system to require recognizable proof of re-
sults prior to commiting their own level in an organization development
program.)
6. The Navy effort, despite support and encouragement from the
highest organizational levels, encountered the most difficulty from
within the middle management and supervisory ranks. The general per-
ception of the middle levels of the Navy organization was that organization
development was not their program but just another competing demand upon
their time and energy imposed from the top of the bureaucratic pyramid.
(An organization development program to enjoy system-wide success must
plan to obtain the active involvement of the middle and supervisory
levels as well as the support of top management.)
7. A foundation stone of the Navy system development program is
the providing of organizational consultative assistance to those persons
in charge of its principal components. Protection of the confidentiality
of the diagnostic data generated in the consultative relationship has
been guaranteed by top management edict. The continued guarantee of
confidentiality, especially in the light of unsuccessful attempts to
breach it from within the organizational structure, has provided the
Navy organization development program with a high degree of client cred-
ibility. (It appears to be* important for the success of an organization
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development effort that its change agents be viewed by potential clients
as helpful resources and not as inspectors providing a "report card" to
higher authority.)
8. During the evolution of the Navy organization development effort
a spectrum of change designs from the highly structured to the highly
flexible were tried. Extremes were found to be generally ineffective
in the large Navy system. The high structure designs were diffcult to
adjust to the great functional diversity of Navy units and the varying
tempo of their operational environments. The high flexibility designs
required a great degree of consultant sophistication, produced incon-
sistent outcomes, made it difficult to allocate limited specialist
resources, and generated problems in assessing overall systemic impAct.
(The balance between" structure and flexibility in a large system-
planned change design is likely to be a significant consideration
bearing on the success of the effort*)
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"The Peter Probability : The scientific method, your true gift of pro-
phecy, only shows you the approximate shape of things to come,"
(Peter, 1972)
PROLEPSIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The Navy organization development program shows strong signs of mov-
ing out of its present stage of consolidation and institutionalization.
This current period of little visible change was preceded by earlier
phases of planting, sprouting, and rapid growth. The next stage is likely
to be one of slow controlled metamorphosis with careful regard for environ-
mental conditions. In view of present trends and anticipated future
events it appears likely that:
° The goals of the Human Resource Management Support System (large-
system change objectives) will be translated into more measurable organi-
zational effectiveness objectives that can form the basis of a relevant
»
evaluation system.
° A mechanism will be developed for better information sharing among
the various components of the organization development system at the
operational and practitioner level. A computer based management infor-
mation system, joint problem task forces, and system-wide symposiums
will become common.
° There will be a need for greater flexibility of program delivery in
terms of type and intensity of activities and with whom and at what times
they will be conducted. This will be offset, somewhat, by increased
requirements for standardization. Clients will have an increased voice
in what they are to receive and how they will obtain it.
° Organizational task, structure, and technological problems and
opportunities will receive increasing program emphasis as well as people-
oriented processes. Increased cooperation with other Navy activities
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involved with achieving constructive change in these new areas will be
brought about through recognition of shared interest.
The Navy organization development program will face a continued
drain on its level of expertise and experience as the initial cadre of
practitioners and administrators leave the system. This drain will be
particularly acute in the area of senior enlisted practitioners. The
losses will be partially offset by the introduction of graduated from
the Naval Postgraduate School Master's Degree Program in Human Resource
Management and officers returning to the program after a tour of opera-
tional duty.
The Navy Leadership and Management Education and Training program
will grow into a more comprehensive management development system and be-
eons an integral component of the overall organization improvement effort.
8 Increased pressure will be generated toward inter-service shar-
ing of knowledge and resources as an attempt to control mounting costs
and overlap of effort • There will be higher levels of practitioner
cross training^ movement toward a common postgraduate education center,
and cooperation on joint-service organization development projects.
* Training in conflict-resolution techniques will be offered increas-
ingly as one mechanism to deal with the threat of military unionization.
* A Navy Applied Human Resource Management Research Institute will be
established to bridge the gap between the primarily basic organizational
researoh currently conducted and the needs of the practitioner for work-.
able new tools, and techniques » A closer working relationship will occur
among governmental and civilian activities engaged in organisation develop-
ment research* organisation development research will become routinely




° Evaluative data developed from the Navy organization development
program will be increasingly keyed to the specialized requirements of
different types and levels of decision makers and resource allocators.
The different constituencies needing assessment information will be
carefully identified and supplied the level of statistically or sub-
jectively based data that they actually require.
° A comprehensive attempt will be made to synthesize and transform
currently available evaluation research into impact data on top
management articulated overall Navy change targets.
° The human resource management data bank will be utilized to
identify trends in Navy organizational system functioning. Recommenda-
tions for possible policy and operations changes will be proposed to
higher Navy leadership on the basis of an analysis of the trends.
In general, the future of organization development in the Navy
looks like a time for evolution and not revolution; a period of increas-
ing maturity and acceptance. It should also be a time in which the per-
sonnel and technical priorities of the Navy reach an equitable balance;
a time when the interdependence of task, structure, people, and technology
becomes an acknowledged reality.
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"'Twas a difficult task for my logical mind, but the chief taught me
all that he knew about orbital prose, multinegative cues, and adjust-
ive subliminal views." (Boren, 1972)
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
IN THE WAKE OF THE PROGRAM
Why all this fuss about planning for change in large organizational
systems? It has been proposed by several respected organizational com-
mentators (Gardner, 1966; Bennis , 1966; and Lippitt, 1970) that large
organizations, without a built-in renewal and self-reformation process,
may be doomed to become ever more devitalized and increasingly less
efficient. At least one writer suggests that the fate of gargantuan
organizations may be even more serious - eventual extinction like the
prehistoric dinosaurs. Connellan (1976), to explain this phenomenon
of large system decay, proposes what he calls the "Brontosaurus Prin-
ciple." The principle states that "Organizations can grow faster than
their brains can -manage them in relation to their environment and to
their own physiology: when this occurs they are an endangered species."
I would suggest a more commonplace and pragmatic answer to the
question of why to become involved with large system organization devel-
opment-improved effectiveness. Rear Admiral Charles Rauch, formerly
head of the Navy's Human Resource Management Project, has indicated that
improved effectiveness is the real goal of the Navy organization devel-
opment program. Admiral Rauch stated, "...its purpose (the Human Re-
source Management Program) is to improve the Navy's operational effect-
iveness..." (Rauch, 1976). Since there appears to be almost as much
confusion and contention about the word effectiveness as there is
about definitions of organization development, for purposes of this
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paper effectiveness will be defined as the product of three inter-
dependent factors: purpose accomplishment, member satisfaction, and
survival. (Forbes, 1976). Therefore the payoff for the high price
of large-system investment in a planned change development should be
measurable improvements in: (1) mission and task achievement, (2) the
satisfaction levels of people, and (3) the probability of its sur-
vival.
Given that a strategy to improve large system organizational
effectiveness is a worthwhile endeavor, is organization development
the best way to undertake the effort? Increasingly organizational
researchers are asking questions like this in articles such as "Can
OD be Fine-Tuned to Bureaucracies?" (Greiner and Schein, 1977).
What is the evidence?
Historically, the Navy's attempt at large system organization
development compares favorably in terms of size, duration, and degree
of success with other such efforts within the Federal bureaucracy.
The State Department (Marrow, 1974), the U.S. Army Chaplaincy (Mill,
1974), and the Bureau of Reclamation (Farrell, 1973) among others,
have tried large-scale planned change programs with varying degrees of
success. In the private sector TRW Systems (Davis, 1969), SAGA (Crock-
ett, 1972), Texas Instruments (Rush, 1972), and Harwood Manufacturing
(Marrow, 1967) are representative of having developed large system
change programs
.
Several social commentators (Strickland, 1970; Toffler, 1970; and
Newman, 1973) have theorized that the accelerating rate of change,
particularly in the technological sphere, has created large scale social
problems. As a consequence of such rapid changes the advance of
technology has made solving hardware problems much easier and social
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problems more difficult than ever before. The logical extension of
this way of thinking is that the answers to social and political ques-
tions are to be found in more complex hardware, However, there is
some evidence to suggest that what has been learned through attempt-
ing to resolve complex large system organizational issues may greatly
contribute to the resolution of technical problems (Sayles, 1971).
Research into the diffusion of important technological or scientific
findings from inception to use indicates a typical five to ten year
time lag (McClelland, 1968). In particular, what we are learning from
the Navy organization development effort about how various technological
and social subsystems interact and influence each other, may have important J.mp
cations for the successful management of complex hardware projects.
It has been said with some conviction that we have achieved
limited penetration into the planned changing of macro-systems (Benne,
1976). In terms of a planned change strategy for a large system, the
Navy effort might be called the "penicillin" approach. The underlying
assumptions seem to be that: (1) the Navy system in general suffers
from a number of specified and unspecified complaints that hamper its
organizational health; (2) the development and administration of a
broad spectrum anti-symptom vaccine is the treatment of choice; (3)
that the worker levels should get the treatment first (because that's
where the action is, and the higher levels already possess some immunity);
(4) that the results will be justified through some detectable improve-
ment in the health of the majority of cases (the average
incidences of the key symptoms will be reduced); (5) that some remark-
able "cures" will occur to provide immediate justification of the
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developmental costs incurred; and (6) that the level of treatment
"rejections" and negative side effects are manageable. It is also
helpful to the adoption of this strategy that the treatment can be
professionally designed and tested; is able to be mass produced in
standardized units; can be quality controlled; is easily given by
para-professionals; can cover a wide band of known ills; and can reach
a large population quickly. Some questions that arise concerning
utilizing the penicillin approach are: To what extent does everyone
need it? Are there currently better treatments available? Do we
really know under what conditions it is best employed? Is it cost
effective? How do we know if it's really working or not? How can we
minimize the bad side effects?
The Navy has also opted for "institutionalization" as a means of
keeping the concept and practice of organization development alive
within the organization itself. The decision to utilize institution-
alization as a planned-change program survival-strategy appears, in
retrospect, to have been predicated on a series of advantages that were
likely to accrue if it was successful. Among these advantages are:
the development of a wider base of organizational support for the
effort through active participation; incorporation of organization
development ideas and principles into the Navy's routine way of con-
ducting business; increasing program ownership by making line authority
accountable for achieving results in improved organizational function-
ing; the potential for reaching the mainstream organizational audience;
making supportive resource allocation a regular and accepted function;




Institutionalization, when compared to the earlier project-type
approach, can also be seen to have had some distinct disadvantages as
a survival promoting organization development strategy. A few of the
more notable program costs appear to have been:
A reduced program priority - lower level organizational command-
ers now establish their own relative priorities among a wide
variety of competing programs.
° Less visibility with top management - a reduced level of direct
commander interest and support caused by a greater decentraliza-
tion of responsibility and authority.
° A loss of resource allocation protection - money and people sup-
plies are now subjected to the competition of the internal mar-
ketplace.
An increased need for integrative organizational mechanisms - a
more highly differentiated organization structure necessitates
*
more time and energy involvement in coordination activities.
A lower level of innovation - emphasis is upon operational pro-
ductivity and quantity not creativity.
° Less adaptability and flexibility - increased pressures to con-
form to established rules and procedures.
Longer timeframes for implementing system-wide decisions - a greater
number and diversity of suborganization units must agree prior
to implementation.
An erosion of common vision - a greater number of component sub-
systems are providing their own unique interpretations and mean-
ings of the intent of the effort.
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Perhaps one potentially useful way to view the Navy system change
effort is to see it as a series of growth stages. One such viewpoint
comes out of the literature of group dynamics. Four relatively distinct
developmental stages in the evolution of a successful task group in re-
lating to authority figures is described by Jones (1973). The Navy
program has proceeded through periods of dependence (the pilot group
phase), conflict (the early project office phase), cohesion (the staff
program phase), and interdependence (the institutionalization phase).
The developmental effort also bears a strong resemblance to the
stages of corporate growth first articulated by Blake, Avis, and Mouton
(1966). These authors hypothesized that the typically successful busi-
ness proceeded through a recognizable series of growth stages. The
first stage was entrepreneurship; the initial rapid growth of an organ-
ization through the efforts of an individual or small group in identi-
fying and meeting an environmental need, which corresponds to the work
of the Navy human resource management pilot group. The second stage,
called the mechanistic corporation, is characterized by the development
of systems, practices, and traditions applied to operations in a mechan-
ical way; roughly corresponding to the Navy's command development and
human resource management cycle programs. The final stage of corporate
growth is called the dynamic corporation and is recognizable by the
retention of systematic practices and the restoration of organizational
vigor as well as the promulgation of widely known organizational
objectives and energetic commitment of the membership to the organiza-
tion's purposes. In my judgment, the Navy program seems currently to
be poised between the mechanistic and dynamic corporate stages and seems
to be very unclear as to how to move on to the next stage.
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One danger to that next stage movement is contained in the words
"group think." Group think is a phenomenon described by Janis (1972)
that places the need of a cohesive group to move toward consensus at
the expense of critical thinking. This tendency places a higher value
upon decision acceptance than upon decision quality. It is character-
ized by decision makers' illusions of invulnerability, their illusion
of unanimity, a suppression of personal doubts and by self-appointed
mindguards.
Many of the decisions of consequence in the Human Resource Manage-
ment Support System are the products of group thought, either directly
as in the form of task groups or more indirectly through staff study
recommendations. What this suggests is that care be exercised in tak-
ing the next major organization development step in the Navy system;
that respect for one anothers reputations and opinions not lead us to
believe they are necessarily true; that personal doubts concerning pro-
posed courses of actions be allowed to surface and be examined; that we
not be lulled into believing that all are committed to and will earnestly
support the decision group's selected alternative; and that we resist,
when conscience requires, those direct and subtle pressures for group
conformity. What the organization development program most needs at this
critical time are both effective individual and group decisions, those
that reflect both high quality and high acceptability.
The present status of the Navy organization development program is,
in my estimation, best characterized by attempts to reduce a condition
of moderate-to-high uncertainty. The uncertainty seems to center around
long-term program goals, how to best realize the goals, making the
effort more responsive to the client's felt needs, demonstration of
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program impact, and better utilization of assigned resources. The
Navy program's leadership appears to be in the very early stages of
determining how to move toward replacing the ambiguity with improved
structure and processes.
From the perspective of a "grandfather" participant-observer in
the Navy organization development effort I would like to propose a ser-
ies of recommendations aimed at enhancing its own self-renewal. These
recommendations are shown in Table One. This listing is not intended
to be all inclusive, but to suggest some concrete ways in which the
present program might be improved. Most of the recommendations could
be enacted under the Navy system's present level of autonomy and con-
trol of required resources.
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The information we have is not what we want;
the information we want is not what we need;




In this paper we have explored the form and substance of the
Navy's effort in system-wide planned change. The effort is probably
better described as an ongoing organizational experiment - for all the
results are not yet in. Its history is rooted in the sociology of Ameri-
can life in the early seventies, its present scale and sweep the product
of the imagination and commitment of a small leadership group.
Beginning as an action-research task group, the Navy program in
organization development found strong support in a change-oriented top
management team. As a systematic strategy for organizational change in
a tradition-oriented authoritarian structure, it synthesized for its own
use an eclectic grab-bag of working organization development technology.
This technology was shaped into a step-sequenced development program
that could be used with a wide variety of Navy units.
The initial highly structured change program called "Command Develop-
ment" was tested, refined, and ultimately found wanting. Its principal
faults were that it couldn't reach enough people, soon enough, with enough
impact. It required too much time, lacked clear definition of purpose, and
had a narrow base of organizational support. What was needed was a pro-
gram that could be easily assimilated by the organizational structure,
had the potential for improving organizational performance in key areas,
and had a high probability of long term survival.
A second generation organization development approach titled, "The
Human Resource Management Cycle," was designed to correct these deficiencies,
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Its principal feature was an instrument-based methodology to
diagnosing organizational functioning labelled, "Survey-guided Develop-
ment." This new approach was a prescribed, scheduled, semi-structured
sequence of events aimed at the Navy's operating forces. It has since
become an institutionalized organizational process largely through the
advocacy and efforts of its Navy sponsors.
At present the program has touched most of the working levels of
the Navy and has begun to be used at higher management levels in the
command structure. Its success has been difficult to measure and its
change approach is controversial, gaining both high-echelon supporters
and detractors. Perhaps the best indicators of its current worth to the
organization are that it continues to receive required resources in the
form of money and people, it is the object of supportive statements
before Congressional committees, and that it commands a place on busy
operational schedules.
The six-year growth of the Navy organization development program
has paralleled that of an evolving human being. It has experienced pangs
of birth, a protected infancy, an exploratory childhood, a troubled
adolescence, and now stands on the brink of its maturity. It has learned
most of its lessons the hard way and is now faced with the value-laden
dilemmas of adulthood. It is hoped that what the Navy program has experi-
enced will not only benefit itself in terms of the choices it makes about
the future but also to provide useful information to other large systems
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